Abstract: Consider a state that chooses security levels at two sites (Targets A and B), after which a terrorist chooses which site to attack (and potentially a scope of attack).
Introduction
There is strong evidence that terrorists are rational and respond to incentives. For example, if tougher measures are taken against skyjackings or attacks on airports, terrorists may instead target trains; if security at embassies is improved, terrorists may switch to kidnappings. Enders and Sandler (1993 , 1995 ) and Sandler and Enders (2004) offer empirical support for terrorists' rationality in the form of observable responses to changes in constraints (e.g., substitution away from skyjackings to kidnappings after airports installed metal detectors).
1 Thus, expenditures on counterterrorism very often have the effect of displacing terrorist attacks from one target to another (Economist, March 8, 2008, p. 69) .
Our purpose is to analyze a government's decision on how to allocate protective resources across different targets within a single country. These alternative targets can be interpreted either as geographical venues (e.g., cities versus borders) or as different types of attacks (e.g., nuclear versus biological).
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In this respect, our approach differs from much of the existing literature on strategic counterterrorism, which focuses on interactions between different target countries or between targets within the same country that are treated as independent decisionmakers. Our interest in a centralized decisionmaker is motivated in part by a growing concern among scholars and the media with the costs and inefficiencies of counterterrorism policies. A high-profile critique of U.S. spending on the Iraq war 3 by Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008) , 4 puts the cost of the war at an exorbitant $3 trillion and argues that the U.S. government adopted a shortsighted allocation of resources, economizing on the costs of equipment for the troops at 1 Enders, Sandler, and Cauley (1990) use time-series techniques to evaluate short-, medium-and long-run effects of specific terrorist-thwarting policies, such as metal detectors, enhanced security for U.S. embassies and personnel, and the U.S.
retaliatory strike against Libya in April 1986. Brandt and Sandler (2010) document empirically how the hardening of some targets has led to more attacks on other targets, for example, as government and military targets have been defended more successfully, terrorists have substituted toward increased attacks on businesses and private individuals. 2 See Bier, Oliveros, and Samuelson (2007, p. 564) .
3 While the Iraq war may not be considered a counterterrorism expenditure, a case can be made that, at least at its outset, it was a component of the "war on terror." See Lowenberg and Mathews (2008) . 4 See also Bilmes and Stiglitz (2006) . the expense of higher casualties and medical care burdens in the future. 5 A study by Sandler, Arce, and Enders (2008) suggests that much of the spending on counterterrorism fails a simple cost-benefit test.
They estimate that global spending on homeland security has risen by $65 billion to $200 billion per year since 2001. In their calculation, the aggressive increase in counterterrorism spending in following the 9/11 attacks produced only five to eight cents of benefits per dollar spent. 6 Thus, it is useful to closely examine how a target country should allocate counterterrorism resources, especially since terrorists' behavior can be influenced by the defensive actions of a target state. Sandler and Arce (2007) provide an excellent survey of the vast literature on game theoretic analyses of terrorism and counterterrorism policies. More recent developments in the literature are discussed by Sandler and Siqueira (2009) . As these authors note, the fundamental nature of the interaction between terrorists and their targets is strategic, often due to the presence of many uncompensated interdependencies in the form of public good and externality effects. An example, noted early in the history of such studies, is that, in a three-player game consisting of two potential target governments and a terrorist group, defensive policies initiated independently by one target government create negative spillover effects for other targets, by deflecting terrorist attacks to the relatively "soft" target (Sandler and Lapan, 1988; Sandler and Siqueira, 2006) . That is, defensive policies are strategic complements: one target's defensive policies potentially deflect attacks to the other target, requiring the latter to respond with its own defensive measures. When defensive resources are chosen by two independent decisionmakers, the result is a costly and Pareto inferior deterrence race among target countries. Such a game is effectively an open-access commons problem, or congestion externality, 7 in which the socially efficient outcome is mutual inaction whereas the dominant strategy is to take action. 8 However, this effect of "increasing defensive efforts at one target makes other targets more desirable"
5 Economist, March 15, 2008, p. 98 . Other analysts, however, have accused Stiglitz and Bilmes of overstating some costs. 6 See Economist, March 8, 2008, p. 69. 7 See Keohane and Zeckhauser (2003) . 8 Cadigan and Schmitt (2010) verify, using laboratory experiments, the finding that negative externalities produce overinvestment in deterrence expenditures.
is present even when levels of protective resources are chosen by a single decisionmaker. Consider a state setting security levels at two sites, Target A and Target B. When assessing the terrorists' desirability for attacking A, the state need not be worried about "external costs" stemming from the fact that A becomes a relatively more desirable target when B is more heavily defended, not because the costs are absent but rather because the costs are not external. That is, when choosing defensive efforts at each site, it is critical for the state to be cognizant of and carefully account for such cross target effects. In the present paper, we analyze the decision of a single government regarding levels of protection at alternative targets.
We conclude this section by summarizing the recent work most closely related to the present study.
Powell (2007) analyzes a government's allocation of a fixed amount of defensive resources across multiple domestic target venues, under the assumption that the government is uninformed about the terrorists' preferences regarding choice of target. When making its choice, the government must account for: the loss incurred as a result of a successful attack on a given venue; the vulnerability of the venue (i.e., the probability an attack will succeed); and the probability of an attack occurring, which is determined by the terrorists' choice of target. Powell focuses on an environment in which a target becomes less attractive to the terrorists when it is more heavily defended. 9 Under this assumption, Powell clearly explains how increasing defensive resources at a venue has competing effects: the marginal expected loss to the government at the first venue declines, while that at the alternative venue increases. He extends his model to the N-target case, using a minimax algorithm to solve the game in order to illustrate how the government would optimally allocate defensive resources.
The two papers most closely related to the present study are Bier, Oliveros, and Samuelson (2007) and Zhuang and Bier (2007) . In contrast to Powell (2007) , in each of these studies the total amount of resources available to the defender is endogenously determined. Further, in Zhuang and Bier (2007) the terrorists get to choose both the location and scope of their attack (i.e., the amount of resources devoted to the attack), but these authors examine only an environment of complete information, in which both players know the true values of all relevant parameters. In contrast, Bier, Oliveros, and Samuelson (2007) consider an environment in which there is incomplete information regarding the value that the attacker places on each target, but they do not allow the attacker to have a choice regarding the scope of attack. In further contrast to Powell (2007) , each of these studies provides some discussion of instances in which staging an attack is costly for the terrorists (so that an attack is not always staged with certainty).
Several interesting results are derived from these models. First, it is shown that the terrorists' attack efforts and the state's defensive investments may be strategic complements (i.e., increased defense expenditures by the government may lead to increased attack efforts by the terrorists and vice versa).
In such cases, increased levels of activity by either party may ultimately be mutually welfare reducing.
These authors also demonstrate that the state has a strategic interest in moving first, thereby inducing the terrorists to attack more vulnerable but less valuable targets. Due to this first-mover advantage, the government may prefer its defense allocations to be observable, as opposed to unobservable. 10 These models (as well as those of Farrow (2007) and Lee (2007) ) also illustrate that a venue may be left undefended in equilibrium, even if it is subject to a positive probability of attack, if the expected losses to the government from an attack are low relative to the opportunity cost of enhanced defenses.
In the present study we focus on the choice of defensive resources across two targets by a centralized decisionmaker. As in Bier, Oliveros, and Samuelson (2007) and Zhuang and Bier (2007) , the total amount of defensive resources is endogenously determined. Further, we generally allow for incomplete information regarding the terrorist's "type" and allow the terrorist to choose both a target and scope of 10 However, Bier (2011) and Alagoz (2010) , allowing for two-sided uncertainty in which neither player knows the other's capabilities or efforts, show that secrecy by the government may be optimal as a consequence of the endogenous response of the terrorists. Bernhardt and Polborn (2010) argue that, due to non-convexities in defense strategies, a government that attaches similar values to alternative targets might benefit from concealing its defense allocations from the terrorists.
attack, assumptions which when made together differentiate this study from the existing literature.
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In Section 2 a theoretical model is specified and preliminary insights on the behavior of both the terrorist and state are obtained. It is shown that if the terrorist is certain to value a specific target more highly, then the state will allocate a greater amount of security resources to this target (even if this is not the target that the state values more highly). A closer examination of situations of complete information is provided in Section 3. Within this discussion, it is shown how the preference of the state regarding where an attack is ultimately staged in such a setting depends critically upon the ratio of target valuations for both the state and terrorist. Further, it is noted how it may be best for the state to leave a target undefended and may be best for the state to choose security levels sufficiently high so that no attack is staged.
Additional insights on situations of incomplete information are provided in Section 4. It is noted how it may be best for the state to leave a target completely undefended, even if it will be attacked with positive probability (an insight obtained in previous studies). Further, we compare the equilibrium "probability of attack" and "expected damage" across targets (comparisons not made in previous studies) to illustrate that it may be best for the state to choose security levels: for which an attack is more likely to be staged on the target that is more highly valued by the state; and for which the expected damage from a terrorist attack is greater at the target which is more highly valued by the state. In total, our results reveal the strong degree to which the state's choice of security is driven by the target valuations of the terrorist.
Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical Model
Consider a terrorist organization (denoted T ) looking to stage an attack within the homeland of a state 11 Additionally, several minor modeling assumptions differ from previous studies. For example, when modeling the choice of security, Bier, Oliveros, and Samuelson (2007) allow the state to have a direct choice of the "success probability for the terrorists' attack" while incurring security costs that are non-linear in this probability. In contrast, we assume security costs are a linear function while the terrorists' success probability is a non-linear function of the government's security level.
(denoted S). 12 Suppose T will attack at most one of two targets (denoted Target A and Target B). Let V Si > 0 denote the value that S places on Target i, for i ∈ {A, B}. Likewise, let V T i denote the value that T places on Target i, for i ∈ {A, B}. We assume throughout that the values of V SA and V SB are known by both players, but we allow for incomplete information regarding the true values of V T A and V T B . 13 The true pair of (V T A , V T B ) identifies the type of T . Let V T denote the set of possible types of T , and suppose (V T A , V T B ) ∈ V T is determined as the realization of a single draw from the joint distribution function
placing strictly positive probability on all points in V T . By incomplete information, we mean that while T knows the true values of (V T A , V T B ), S does not know these exact values but rather knows only the distribution function
which the type of T is determined.
Before T chooses which target to attack, S sets levels of homeland security at each site (h i ≥ 0 denotes the level at Target i). After observing the security levels, T chooses which target to attack (with no attack being an option) along with the scope of attack (r i ≥ 0 denotes the amount of resources devoted to attacking Target < 0 for all h > 0 (increasing the scope of the attack increases the damage from the attack, but does so at a decreasing rate)
or ∂D(h,r) ∂r = 0 for all h > 0 (the damage from the attack does not depend at all upon the scope of the attack, so that in practice T is simply choosing where to attack); D(0, r) = 1 for all r ≥ 0 (an attack on an undefended target imposes the full loss of V Si on S and gives T the full gain of V T i , even an attack of 12 A summary of all notations is provided in Table 1 . 13 As will be discussed below, because of the way in which the timing of the decisions is modeled, the analysis and results
would not differ if we additionally allowed there to be incomplete information with respect to the values of V SA and V SB .
zero scope); and D(h, r) → 0 as h → ∞ for all r ≥ 0.
Suppose S incurs a constant marginal cost of C S > 0 from increasing homeland security at either target, so that choosing (h A , h B ) costs [h A +h B ]C S . These costs are incurred regardless of T 's subsequent choice. Thus, S has a payoff of:
is attacked with scope r B ; and
Suppose T incurs fixed costs of F T from staging an attack, a value which depends upon neither which target is attacked nor the level of security at the targeted site. 14 Additionally, T incurs a marginal cost of C T > 0 when increasing the scope of an attack at either target. Thus, T realizes a pay- We focus on a single period, sequential decision making environment, in which S first chooses
. After S makes this observable choice, T then chooses to attack A, B, or neither target (and, if staging an attack, chooses the scope of the attack). We generally consider an environment of incomplete information in which S chooses (h A , h B ) without knowing the actual values of (V T A , V T B ) but rather knowing only the distribution function,
, from which the type of T is drawn.
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The game is analyzed via backward induction. 16 When S chooses (h A , h B ), he does so without knowing the actual (V T A , V T B ) but with the correct recognition that the subsequent behavior of T depends critically on the chosen (h A , h B ) and actual values of (V T A , V T B ). Thus, S bases his choice on a computation of his expected payoff, supposing T will behave rationally (given his actual type) and with 14 These fixed costs can be entirely avoided by staging no attack. Note, the assumption that T attacks at most one target can be justified by assuming that either: the fixed costs of staging a second attack are so large, that doing so is never desirable; or the marginal benefit to T of attacking and damaging a second target is so small, that doing so is never desirable. 15 Complete information can be thought of as a special case, in which V T consists of a single pair of values (V T A , V T B ).
an appropriate weight assigned to each possible realization of type for T (according to the distribution
A and h * B denote the equilibrium levels of homeland security for S. We aim to gain insight into how h * A and h * B relate to each other and depend upon the parameters of the model. When doing so, it is necessary to understand how this choice by S impacts the choice of target and scope by T .
Initial Insights on the Choice of Target/Scope by T
Focusing on the choice by T in the terminal node of the game, we can think of T first determining the ideal scope for attacking each possible target. 17 Let r * i (h i ) denote the optimal scope of attack on Target i, and let π *
denote the resulting payoff of T from staging such an attack. Recall,
solution) satisfy the first order condition
V
= 0 for all r ≥ 0, then the optimal choice of scope by T is simply the corner solution of r * i = 0.
After identifying r *
A (h A ) and r * B (h B ) and determining π *
18 It is instructive to see how
both h i and V T i . Lemma 1 addresses the first of these issues.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary h i =h, for whichr = r * i (h) and π *
17 Returning attention to the impact of the informational structure on the behavior of the players, recognize that: the payoff of T does not directly depend upon V SA and V SB ; T is only called upon to act once, in the terminal node of the game; and T is able to observe (h A , h B ) before deciding how to act. Thus, the behavior of T could never depend upon the beliefs that T holds regarding the values of V SA and V SB , implying that the analysis would proceed in an identical manner if we additionally allowed there to be incomplete information regarding the type of S.
18 If any of these conditions hold with equality, then T has two or more options that yield his maximal payoff. In such instances, T is indifferent with respect to choosing among these best options.
Suppose that S had instead chosen h i =ĥ withĥ <h. Since
. Thus, even if T were to still chooser when S choosesĥ, T would realize a larger payoff:
Sincer need not be optimal when h i =ĥ, T 's payoff must be even greater forr = r *
Lemma 1 implies that when S increases the level of security at a target, attacking the target becomes less desirable to T (even after accounting for the fact that T could alter his scope of attack). Inspection
increasing h i decreases the value of π T i (h i , r i ) at each r i . Thus, the maximum value of π T i (h i , r i ) (when maximized with respect to r i ) must be smaller when a larger value of h i is chosen. Further, increasing h i has no direct impact on the payoff of T from attacking the alternative target.
Leth i denote the smallest value of h i for which π * 
The combinations of (h A , h B ) for which the condition in (1) holds with equality define a "locus of indifference in (h A , h B )-space" for T with respect to attacking A versus attacking B.
19 Assuming D(h, r) → 0 as h → ∞ for all r ≥ 0 guarantees that π * T i (h i ) becomes negative for arbitrarily large h i . 20 Since the expression on the left side of (1) is decreasing in h A and does not depend upon h B while the expression on the right side of (1) is decreasing in h B and does not depend upon h A , it follows that this locus must be upward sloping.
Additionally, this locus must pass through (h
accounting for the actual values of (V T A , V T B )) is illustrated in Figure 1 . Inspection of Figure 1 reveals the following intuitive points -other factors fixed, T will: attack A when the h A is relatively small; attack B when h B is relatively small; and attack neither target when h A and h B are both relatively large.
We now address the preference of target for T when h A = h B = h, which allows us to determine whether this locus in (h A , h B )-space lies above or below the 45
• -line. Lemma 2 provides such a characterization, dependent upon the relation of
to a value of one.
Proof. Regardless of the magnitude of
, the desired insight depends upon a comparison of
essentially the comparison made by condition (1) evaluated at h
0 the optimal choice of scope must satisfy
This latter expression is the payoff to T from attacking A with scope r * B (h) (the optimal scope for
The proof of the third portion of the lemma proceeds along identical lines and is omitted for brevity.
By Lemma 2, if S defends the targets equally, T prefers to attack the target which T values more.
For example, when V T A > V T B (i.e., α T < 1), the locus lies strictly below the 45 • -line (as illustrated in Figure 1 ). Thus, for h A = h B = h, T realizes a greater payoff from attacking A than from attacking B.
Since the choice of (h A , h B ) is generally made by S in an environment of incomplete information, it is instructive to recognize how (for chosen levels of h A and h B ) the choice of target by T depends upon the realized V T A and V T B . Toward this end, recognize that (as stated by Lemma 3) for arbitrary levels of
Proof. To recognize why this lemma is not self evident, recall that generally r * i (h i ) (and thus
Fixing h i , letṼ T i denote an arbitrary realized value of V T i , for which r * i is the corresponding optimal scope when attacking Target i. This realization ofṼ T i and choice ofr * i lead toπ *
optimal scope of attack whenV T i is realized, for whichπ *
e., the payoff of T is larger for the larger V T i , without altering the scope of attack). Sincer * i
is the optimal scope whenV T i is realized, it follows thatπ *
Lemma 3 states that for any arbitrarily fixed value of h i , the payoff for T from staging an attack of optimal scope on Target i is increasing in the realized value of V T i . Further note that a larger realization of V T i does not impact the payoff to T from attacking the alternate site whatsoever. Finally, recall that staging no attack and realizing a payoff of π T ∅ = 0 is always an option. 
These observations imply that for any chosen (h
Recognizing that this comparison is identical to that described by (1), we can construct a "locus of
this locus as a function of the chosen security levels and realized V T A . For an arbitrary V T A ≥V T A (h A ),
. Figure 2 illustrates how (for chosen values of (h A , h B )) the choice of target depends upon the realized (V T A , V T B ).
For (V T A , V T B ): in Area A2, T will attack A; in Area B2, T will attack B; and in Area N 2, T will not stage an attack. Inspection of Figure 2 reveals the following intuitive points -other factors fixed, T will:
attack A when V T A is relatively large; attack B when V T B is relatively large; and attack neither target when V T A and V T B are both relatively small.
Initial Insights on the Choice of Homeland Security Levels by S
To see how changes in h A or h B alter the choice of target by T , we need to determine how such changes impact the boundaries in Figure 2 . Consider an increase in h A fromĥ A toh A with h B fixed. 
21 Lemma 3 implies that this locus must be upward sloping in (V T A , V T B )-space.
22 Because of the symmetric nature of the problem, similar insights would follow for an increase in h B with h A fixed.
Linking this discussion to Figure 2 reveals the two ways that increasing h A alters the target choice of
, the boundary between Area A2 and Area N 2 moves to the right) and V L T B (V T A ,ĥ A , h B ) decreases (i.e., the boundary between Area A2 and Area B2 moves down or equivalently to the right). For chosen (h A , h B ), T will attack A with probability P A (h A , h B ), attack B with probability P B (h A , h B ), and stage no attack with probability P ∅ (h A , h B ) (with each probability determined by integrating over all (V T A , V T B ) in the relevant area of Figure 2 , according to Figure 2 would have a nonempty intersection with V T , so each probability would be strictly positive. As h A is increased, there are some (V T A , V T B ) ∈ V T for which T would have initially attacked A but for which he now attacks B
and there are some (V T A , V T B ) ∈ V T for which T would have initially attacked A but for which he now stages no attack. 23 Thus, increasing h A has not only the two desired effects of decreasing
and increasing P ∅ (h A , h B ), but also the undesired effect of increasing P B (h A , h B ).
If we instead started at (h
) / ∈ V T , then one or more of the probabilities may initially equal zero, and further, an increase in h A might not alter the probabilities. For example, suppose that for an initial (h A , h B ) the set V T lies strictly within the interior of Area A2 in Figure 2 , so that P A (h A , h B ) = 1 and P ∅ (h A , h B ) = P B (h A , h B ) = 0. For a sufficiently small increase in h A the entire set V T will still lie strictly within Area A2, so that we still have P A (h A , h B ) = 1 and
Over this range, increasing h A does not alter the choice of target by T at all, and only has the impact of decreasing the expected damage when A is ultimately attacked.
Recall, if both sites are equally defended, then T prefers to attack the target which he values more highly (Lemma 2). In terms of Figure 2 , this implies that for h A = h B = h, the locus of indiffer-
the locus lies below the 45 • -line); and if h
This relies on the assumption that V T is a convex set, with G T (v T A , v T B ) placing strictly positive probability on all
e., the locus lies above the 45 • -line). Finally, the situation in which S leaves both targets undefended (i.e., h A = h B = 0) is simply a special case of h A = h B = h.
Under the assumption that D(0, r) = 1 for all r ≥ 0, following a choice of h i = 0 by S, if T were to attack Target i he would do so by choosing r i = 0, resulting in D(0, 0) = 1 and π * T i (0) = V T i − F T . This impliesV T i (0) = F T . That is, attacking Target i defended at h i = 0 is better than staging no attack, so long as T 's value for Target i is simply above the fixed cost of staging an attack.
Proposition 1 provides insight on (h *
A , h * B ) for two special cases with respect to V T . By Proposition 1, whenever S knows which target is more highly valued by T , S will choose a (weakly) higher level of security at the target which T values more highly. This begins to reveal the strong degree to which S's optimal choice depends upon the target valuations of T . This should not be entirely surprising, since in any one-shot, sequential move game, the initial choice of Player 1 depends greatly on the subsequent behavior of Player 2 (behavior which is based on the payoffs of Player 2).
The results of Proposition 1 are driven by the fact that S will only ever devote security resources to a target if there is a benefit from doing so. Increasing h i can have the potential benefits of decreasing the expected damage if Target i is attacked and decreasing the probability that Target i is attacked. For example, consider increasing h A , starting at a situation in which initially the entire set V T is in Area B2
in Figure 2 . Since P A = 0 to start, there is no benefit from increasing h A : since A is never attacked, decreasing the expected damage if A is attacked has no benefit; and since the probability of A being attacked is zero, there is no benefit of decreasing the probability with which A is attacked.
Complete Information
Suppose S knows the exact values of V T A and V T B before choosing (h A , h B ). Recall that such an instance of complete information corresponds to a situation in which the entire set V T consists of a single point
, which is clearly covered by Proposition 1. Thus, for the case of complete information: if 
If S chooses (h A , h B ) along the locus of indifference, then (by construction) T is indifferent between
attacking A versus B. However, following such a choice of security levels, S may have a strict preference regarding which target is attacked. In order to ease the analysis, assume that following a choice of (h A , h B ) along this locus, T chooses to attack the target which S prefers to be attacked. 
where the first term reflects the assumption that the attack is staged on the target yielding the greater payoff for S). As h A is increased from below h When analyzing S's choice under complete information, it is critical to determine the preference of S over whether an attack is staged on A versus B for points along the locus in Figure 1 . Condition (1), which defines this locus, can be expressed as:
For chosen
. Imposing (2) (and expressing
, it follows that along this locus π SA > π SB if and only if
Consider ∂D(h,r) ∂r = 0, in which case r *
This implies that on this locus upon which T is indifferent regarding his choice of target, S prefers to have an attack staged on A over B if and only if
S would: choose (h A , h B ) for which A will be attacked, if and only if the state's relative valuation for B is greater than the terrorist's relative valuation for B (i.e., α S > α T ); and choose (h A , h B ) for which B will be attacked, if and only if the state's relative valuation for B is less than the terrorist's relative valuation for B (i.e., α S < α T ). Since α S ≤ 1 by assumption, it follows that whenever α T > 1 (i.e., V T B > V T A ), S would never choose security levels for which A is ultimately attacked. If instead α T < 1 (i.e., V T B < V T A ), then choosing (h A , h B ) along the locus, S may prefer to have the attack staged on A (if α S > α T ) or may prefer to have the attack staged on B (if α S < α T ). To see why the preference of S regarding the target choice by T along the locus reduces to a simple comparison of α S to α T when ∂D(h,r) ∂r = 0, recall that what we are trying to determine is whether S prefers an attack to be staged on A or B, focusing on combinations of (h A , h B ) for which T is indifferent regarding his choice of target. Since S must always incur the security costs at each target, the comparison of π SA to π SB at any (h A , h B ) reduces to a comparison of the expected loss from an attack staged at each (2)).
Returning to the choice of h A , recognize that at the point at which h A is increased toh A (along with h B increased toh B ), π S is characterized by a discrete increase in value to π
This change in π S is certain to be an increase, since as h A and h B are increased from h A =h A − ε . It is possible for the optimal choice of S to be characterized by h * (for which the locus in Figure 1 is defined by h
, and V T A = 1.
, and
. It can be shown that
and h * B = 0, resulting in an attack on A and π *
. As this example illustrates, S may want to leave a target completely undefended.
Example 2:
, and F T = = α S , so that along the locus in Figure   1 , S prefers A to be attacked. It can be shown that h *
, resulting in an attack on A and π *
, and F T = = α S , so that along the locus in Figure   1 , S prefers B to be attacked. It can be shown that h *
, resulting in an attack on B and π *
. This example illustrates how S may prefer to induce an attack on B as opposed to A.
, and F T = 4 11
. Example 4 differs from Example 3 in that F T is larger. When the fixed cost for staging an attack is equal to this larger value,
and h *
, for which no attack is staged and π * S =
−12 25
. Thus, it clearly may be best for S to choose security levels sufficiently high so that no attack is staged.
Further Insights for Situations of Incomplete Information
Recall, under incomplete information S chooses (h A , h B ) to maximize his expected payoff by integrating over all possible types of T (according to G T (v T A , v T B )), anticipating the subsequent behavior of T (for the chosen (h A , h B ) and realized (V T A , V T B )).
When ∂D(h,r) ∂r > 0 the optimal scope of T must satisfy
V T i = C T . Assuming impacts the payoff of S only by altering where the attack is staged and not by altering D(h i , r i ). Thus, for , for which we further have (with respect to the boundaries in Figure 2 ):
Further assume: V T A is determined by a draw from G T A (v) = 27 These assumptions greatly ease the determination of P A (h A , h B ) and P B (h A , h B ), since each probability is simply equal to the ratio of the intersection of the relevant area in Figure 2 with V T to the entire area of the triangle representing
makes the payoff of T from attacking A negative for all possible V T A . Similarly, for any chosen h A ∈ 0,
Even when we restrict attention to the expression for π S is still quite complex and a general analysis of the choice of (h A , h B ) by S is intractable. However, for fixed parameter values, h * A and h * B can be determined numerically. Fixing
, U T A = 1, and
, such numerical results were obtained for variouŝ α (the results are reported in Table 2 ). Parameter values were intentionally chosen with the aim of illustrating the wide range of qualitatively different outcomes that can arise.
The first column in Table 2 lists eachα considered, from smallest to largest. Reading down each remaining column reveals how the value of the corresponding endogenous variable depends uponα.
Since a largerα implies that T is more likely to place a relatively higher value on B, the results provide insight on how the equilibrium depends upon the distribution from which the type of T is drawn. The next three columns report the equilibrium probabilities that T stages an attack on A, stages an attack on B, and attacks neither target. Asα increases, we have the intuitive results that: P * A decreases; P * B increases; and P * decreases. Further, for relatively smallα, we have P *
29 That is, it may be best for S to choose security levels for which an attack is more likely to be staged on the target that S values more highly. This observation is anticipated, since it was already noted that in an environment of complete information it may be best for S to choose security levels for which A is certain to be attacked.
Returning to the columns labeled h * A and h * B , it may be best for S to leave a target completely undefended. However, when S does so under incomplete information, he is leaving a target undefended even though it is attacked with positive probability. For example, forα = 20, h * A = 0 even though
30 For such largeα, T is almost certain to place such a larger value on B than on A, that even a completely undefended Target A will rarely be attacked, to the point where it is best for S to allocate no defensive resources to this target that he values more highly.
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The final two columns in Table 2 report P * i D * i , equilibrium values of the expected damage at each target (i.e., the probability that a target is attacked multiplied by the expected damage to the target when the target is attacked it may be best for S to choose security levels for which the equilibrium expected damage is greater at the target which S values more highly. 33 Again, a parallel can be drawn to the case of complete information where the expected damage is greater at A whenever S chooses security levels for which A is attacked.
As illustrated above, a general analysis of the choice of (h A , h B ) in an environment of incomplete information is intractable. However, insights on S's choice and the resulting equilibrium were obtained by a numerical analysis. The equilibrium could qualitatively differ in several dimensions, in that: ei- 
Conclusion
A single period interaction between a state (S) and a terrorist organization (T ) was analyzed, in which S initially chose security levels at two sites and T subsequently chose the target (and potentially scope) of attack. Increasing security at a site is costly for S, but has the potential benefits of decreasing the expected damage if the site is attacked and decreasing the probability with which the site is attacked.
However, there is an undesired side effect of this second benefit: increasing security at one target may increase the probability that an alternative target is attacked. Thus, a single decisionmaker allocating resources across multiple targets must carefully account for such cross target effects.
If S knows which site is more highly valued by T , then S allocates more security to this site (even if this is not the site that S values more highly). Under complete information, S can correctly infer which target T will attack. A closer examination under complete information revealed the strong degree to which the preference by S over which site is attacked depends on the relative valuation of each player for each target: when the expected damage from an attack does not depend upon the scope of the attack (so that T is effectively choosing only where to attack), then S will set security levels for which T prefers to attack Target A (the target that S values more highly) over Target B if and only if the state's relative valuation for Target B is greater than the terrorist's relative valuation for Target B (i.e., if and only if α S > α T ). Further, it was shown how S may want to leave one of the targets completely undefended and how S may want to choose security levels sufficiently high so that no attack is staged.
A setting of incomplete information was subsequently analyzed in greater detail. A numerical analysis revealed that in equilibrium it may be best: for S to leave a target completely undefended (even if it is attacked with positive probability); for S to choose security levels for which an attack is more likely to be staged on the target that he values more highly; or for S to choose security levels for which the expected damage from a terrorist attack is greater at the target that he values more highly.
As an avenue for further research, our model does not allow for the terrorists' valuation of alternative targets to be affected by the government's allocation of defensive resources (on this point see also Bier, Oliveros, and Samuelson, 2007, p. 585) . Terrorists may possibly value not only damaging a target but also destroying defensive resources at a target. One possible extension of our model would involve intertemporal optimization on the part of both the terrorists and the state, in which the choices in the current period influence target values in the future. Value that S places on Target i, for i ∈ A, B V T i
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